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Just a Miner Threat? The Fourth Circuit Refuses to Review
Temporary Reinstatement Orders Through the Collateral
Order Doctrine

I. Introduction
Finality. The concept manifests in many forms. In the practice of law,
finality functions as the golden rule of appeal. Federal courts of appeal may
only review lower courts’ decisions if those decisions are final.1 Given that
courts of appeal “are courts of limited jurisdiction,”2 the Constitution or a
statute must expressly grant appellate jurisdiction.3 If the statute granting
jurisdiction only allows review of final decisions, the million dollar
question becomes this: What is a final decision? At first blush, the answer
appears obvious. The Supreme Court has defined a final decision as “one
‘by which a district court disassociates itself from a case.’”4 But this
definition is incomplete. Based on a “practical rather than a technical
construction [of 28 U.S.C. § 1291],” 5 the Court has broadened its definition
of final to include a small class of collateral orders that do not end the
litigation. 6 This concept—broadening the concept of finality to encompass
a small class of collateral orders—is widely known as the collateral order
doctrine. 7
This Note explores the ability of appellate courts to review temporary
reinstatement orders issued by the Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Commission (Commission) under the collateral order doctrine. These
unique orders require mine operators to temporarily reinstate terminated
miners pending the outcome of the miners’ discrimination complaint filed
with the Secretary of Labor (Secretary). The Supreme Court has never
addressed whether temporary reinstatement orders are reviewable under the
doctrine, 8 and as a result of the Fourth Circuit’s 2014 decision Cobra
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
2. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
3. Id.
4. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (citing Swint v.
Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)).
5. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 106.
8. See Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d
82, 88 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit’s consideration of the
novel issue “are of limited persuasive effect”).
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Natural Resources, LLC, v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Commission, a circuit split now exists on the subject.9 If the Supreme Court
considers the split, it should hold that temporary reinstatements are
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.
Part II of this Note discusses the collateral order doctrine’s origins, the
evolution and purpose of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,
and the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ application of the doctrine to
temporary reinstatement orders. Part III analyzes the facts, holding, and
majority and dissenting opinions of the Fourth Circuit’s decision. Part IV
argues that the Fourth Circuit’s decision is unjustified because it
exaggerated the impact of a tolling affirmative defense, construed the
doctrine’s severability requirement too narrowly, and failed to consider the
entire class of orders before rendering its decision.
II. Law Before Cobra: The Collateral Order Doctrine, the Mine Act, and
Temporary Reinstatement Orders
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine: Origins and Development
The collateral order doctrine first emerged in the Supreme Court’s 1949
opinion Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation. 10 In Cohen, the
Court encountered a novel jurisdictional question: Did it have the authority
to review a district court’s refusal to apply a New Jersey statute in a
diversity suit? 11 Although the district court’s decision was not final, the
Court nonetheless held that it was reviewable because it fell within the
“small class which finally determine[s] claims of right[s] separable from,
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”12
The Supreme Court’s analysis centered on the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
which governs appeals of final district court decisions. 13 The statute states
that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts . . . .” 14 Rather than construing this
9. Id. at 88 n.11, 92 (acknowledging that by holding temporary reinstatement orders
unreviewable under the collateral order doctrine, the court’s decision was contrary to both
the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits decisions on the matter).
10. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
11. Id. at 543-45.
12. Id. at 546.
13. Id. at 545.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (emphasis added).
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language strictly, the Court acknowledged that the statute receives a
“practical rather than a technical construction.”15 Thus, the collateral order
doctrine emerged as a broader interpretation of finality, not as an exception
to the finality requirement. 16
The Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for the collateral order
doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay. 17 To fall within the scope of the
doctrine, an order must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question,
[2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” 18 The Court construes the test strictly, often emphasizing that
“the ‘narrow’ exception should . . . never be allowed to swallow the general
rule . . . .” 19 When applying the doctrine, a court must not “engage in an
‘individualized jurisdictional inquiry’”20 but rather consider “the ‘entire
category [of orders] to which a claim belongs.’” 21 The doctrine’s narrow
construction prevents “piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . [that]
encroach[] upon the prerogatives of district court judges.”22
The most contentious aspect of the doctrine’s analysis is determining
whether a particular interest advanced by a category of orders is sufficiently
important to qualify for review. 23 The Court has considered only a handful
of interests sufficiently important, applying the collateral order doctrine to a
criminal defendant’s appeal of a double jeopardy claim in Abney v. United
States, 24 a former president’s appeal of an absolute immunity claim in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 25 and a government official’s appeal of a qualified
immunity claim in Mitchell v. Forsyth. 26 These cases focus on the
doctrine’s third prong—effectively unreviewable on appeal. If an order

15. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
16. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994).
17. 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
18. Id.
19. Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added).
20. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009) (quoting Coopers &
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 473).
21. Id. (citing Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868).
22. Id. at 106.
23. Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 878-79 (noting that determining whether an
interest satisfies the doctrine’s third prong “cannot be answered without a judgment about
the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment
requirement”).
24. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
25. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
26. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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forcing a person with a valid double jeopardy, qualified immunity, or
absolute immunity defense to stand trial is not immediately appealable, that
person’s claim would effectively be lost. 27 In each case, the interests
protected outweighed any dangers associated with immediate review.28
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Administrative Decisions
Because the collateral order doctrine is a product of the construction
given to 28 U.S.C. § 1291—the statute governing an appellate court’s
ability to review final district court decisions—the doctrine’s applicability
to administrative decisions is questionable.29 The First Circuit, however,
held in Rhode Island v. EPA that the collateral order doctrine can be used to
review administrative procedures. 30
The First Circuit proffered three reasons for its decision. 31 First, drawing
on a trilogy of then-recent Supreme Court cases, the First Circuit concluded
that the Supreme Court had illustrated its willingness to apply the doctrine
to administrative proceedings. 32 Given what the First Circuit perceived to
be a clear signpost erected by the Supreme Court, it stated that it would be
“loath to strike off in a different direction.”33 Second, the First Circuit noted
that the policy implications did not support the adoption of “a wholly
different rule of finality to review . . . agency determinations.”34 Finally, the
First Circuit reasoned that a contrary finding would create a split with the
circuits that had applied the doctrine to review administrative decisions.35
27. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350-51 (2006).
28. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (noting that a fundamental attribute of immunity is the
“entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation”); Nixon, 457 U.S. at
751 (noting that allowing an immediate appeal of absolute immunity claims would insure
that a president would not be distracted by the possibility of a costly private lawsuit); Abney,
431 U.S. at 660-61 (noting that the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a
criminal defendant from being tried twice, not just sentenced twice, for the same crime).
29. Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 23-25.
32. Id. (noting that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976), FTC v. Standard
Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980), and Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778-79 (1983)
supported the application of the doctrine to administrative proceedings because the Court
concluded that an administrative order could be considered final for review, applied the
collateral order doctrine to review an administrative proceeding, and noted the possibility of
applying the doctrine to review a non-final agency decision, respectively).
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 25 (noting that the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have invoked the doctrine to review administrative decisions).
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C. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
By passing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act),
Congress sought to combat unsafe working conditions associated with mine
operations. 36 Although Congress had previously enacted legislation to
address the safety of miners, it found that the Department of Interior, the
agency responsible for administering those statutes, was “seriously
deficient . . . in its enforcement and administrative responsibilities under
these statutes.” 37 Based on these findings, Congress streamlined the
enforcement of the new comprehensive statute. It transferred the
administration of the Mine Act to the Secretary of Labor, establishing the
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration within the Department of
Labor. It created the Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the
independent body charged with reviewing “orders, citations, and
penalties,” 38 and it also established procedures that allow miners to file
complaints with the Secretary if discrimination occurs because of a safety
complaint.39
By prohibiting mine operators from discharging or discriminating
against miners who file safety complaints with the Secretary, the Mine Act
facilitates enforcement of its provisions.40 When a miner files a
discrimination complaint, two distinct processes occur.41 The first is a
determination of the merits underlying the miner’s discrimination claim. 42
The second-and the primary subject of this Note-is the issuance of a
temporary reinstatement order that restores the miner to his prior position.43
1. The Merits Determination
If a miner believes that a mine operator terminated or discriminated
against him for engaging in a protected activity, such as reporting a health
or safety violation, he may file a complaint with the Secretary within sixty
days of the alleged violation. 44 If the Secretary finds that the mine operator
violated the terms of the Mine Act, the Secretary will immediately file a

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

30 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).
S. REP. NO. 95-181, at 8 (1977).
Id. at 11.
30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2).
Id. § 815(c)(1).
See id. § 815(c)(2).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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complaint with the Commission. 45 After the Commission provides an
opportunity for a formal adjudicative hearing in compliance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 46 it will issue an order “based upon findings
of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary’s proposed
order . . . .” 47 Alternatively, if the Secretary finds that the mine operator did
not violate the Mine Act, the miner may file a complaint directly with the
Commission. 48 The Commission will still provide an opportunity for an
adjudicative hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and
subsequently issue an order either dismissing or sustaining the miner’s
complaint. 49
2. Temporary Reinstatement Orders
In addition to constructing a merits-determination procedure, the Mine
Act establishes a procedure by which terminated miners may temporarily be
reinstated to their previous positions.50 After reviewing the miner’s
complaint, if the Secretary concludes that the claim “was not frivolously
brought,” the Commission will issue an order reinstating the miner pending
the outcome of the miner’s complaint.51 Even if the Commission does not
issue a temporary reinstatement order, the Secretary must still investigate
the underlying discrimination claim. 52
Although the Mine Act does not address adjudicative hearings on
temporary reinstatement orders, the Commission has promulgated
regulations that allow for such a hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) at the mine operator’s request. 53 If a mine operator requests a
hearing, the inquiry is limited to whether the miner’s claim was frivolously
brought. 54 It is neither the ALJ’s nor the Commission’s duty to resolve the
merits of the discrimination claim at the temporary reinstatement phase.55
45. Id.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012).
47. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2).
48. Id. § 815(c)(3).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 815(c)(2).
51. Id.
52. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82,
84 (4th Cir. 2014).
53. Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 920 F.2d 738,
740 (11th Cir. 1990) (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 2700.44(b) (1990)).
54. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Nat. Res.,
LLC, 35 FMSHRC 394 (2013).
55. Id.
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As the name suggests, temporary reinstatement orders do not
permanently reinstate a miner and may be terminated or expire in three
circumstances. First, if the Secretary fails to file a discrimination complaint
with the Commission within ninety days of receiving a miner’s complaint,
an ALJ may dissolve the temporary reinstatement order. 56 Similarly, if after
the investigation, the Secretary concludes that the mine operator did not
violate the provisions of the Mine Act, an ALJ may dissolve the order. 57
Finally, certain economic circumstances, such as layoff or a reduction in
workforce, may toll the mine operator’s obligation to provide back pay to a
terminated worker. 58 In these circumstances, the terminated miner would
only collect back pay up until the time the mine operator would have
terminated him absent the discriminatory treatment. 59 All ALJ decisions on
temporary reinstatement orders are subject to the Commission’s
discretionary review. 60
3. Judicial Review of Final Commission Orders
Section 816 of the Mine Act allows a party “adversely affected or
aggrieved by an order of the Commission” to seek review of the order “in
any United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred. . . .”61 Although the statute’s text does not
specifically limit appellate review to final Commission orders, the Supreme
Court presumes that “judicial review will be available only when agency
action becomes final.” 62 Based on this presumption, several circuit courts
have held that the Mine Act’s language restricts appellate review to final
Commission decisions. 63 That said, appellate courts wait until the
56. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 920 F.2d at 741 (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 2700.44(f)).
57. Id.
58. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res.,
31 FMSHRC 1050, 1054 (2009).
59. Id.
60. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82,
84 (4th Cir. 2014).
61. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1) (2012).
62. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983).
63. See Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1048
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the Mine Act’s legislative history illustrates Congress’s intent
to allow review of final Commission orders); Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 920 F.2d 738, 743 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Although the statute uses the
term ‘order’ rather than ‘final order,’ this omission alone is insufficient to overcome the
general presumption that judicial review of administrative actions is available only when
such decisions have become final.”); Monterey Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 635 F.2d 291, 292 (4th Cir. 1980) (“The statute, amplified by this
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Commission issues an order that “imposes an obligation, denies a right, or
fixes some legal relationship, usually at the consummation of an
administrative process.” 64
D. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Temporary Reinstatement Orders
Because temporary reinstatement orders technically are not final agency
actions, the collateral order doctrine has emerged as a means to review the
orders. 65 Before the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Cobra, both the Eleventh
and Seventh Circuits considered whether the doctrine allowed appellate
courts to review temporary reinstatement orders in Jim Walter Resources,
Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission 66 and Vulcan
Construction Materials v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Commission, 67 respectively. Both concluded that it did.
1. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
In Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Commission, the Eleventh Circuit held that a temporary reinstatement order
was appealable via the collateral order doctrine. 68 Jim Walter Resources,
Inc. terminated two miners, both elected safety committeemen, 69 because

legislative history, demonstrates congressional intent that only final Commission orders
should be reviewed.”).
64. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 59 F.3d 222, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting
Alaska v. FERC, 980 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
65. See Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 85-86 (referencing the collateral order
doctrine to determine whether a temporary reinstatement order was considered final for
judicial review); Vulcan Constr. Materials v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
700 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that although temporary reinstatement orders are
not final agency actions, jurisdiction is still proper through the collateral order doctrine); Jim
Walter Res., Inc., 920 F.2d at 739 (reserving the question of whether temporary
reinstatement orders are final agency actions because jurisdiction was proper under the
collateral order doctrine).
66. 920 F.2d 738.
67. 700 F.3d 297.
68. 920 F.2d at 738-39.
69. “Safety committeemen are elected by the miners and have wide-ranging
responsibilities for insuring mine safety, including inspection and notification duties under
federal mine safety laws, handling of all safety grievances under the collective bargaining
agreement, and the reporting of all mine hazards to management.” Id. at 741.
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they failed to comply with a mandatory drug screening. 70 Both miners had
filed numerous safety complaints with management throughout their tenure
as safety committeemen. 71 They believed their supervisor used the drug
screening policy as a way to terminate the miners for their active
enforcement of safety procedures.72 After the miners filed a discrimination
complaint with the Secretary, an ALJ determined that they did not
frivolously bring the claims and ordered the mine operator to reinstate
them. 73 Jim Walter Resources appealed the temporary reinstatement order
to the Eleventh Circuit. 74
Rather than deciding whether temporary reinstatement orders were
technically final agency actions, the Eleventh Circuit instead found that
jurisdiction was proper under the collateral order doctrine. 75 The court
determined that a temporary reinstatement order satisfied the doctrine’s first
prong because it “is a ‘fully consummated’ decision, and there are literally
‘no further steps’ that JWR [Jim Walter Resources] can take in order to
avoid the Commission’s order at the agency level.” 76 Regardless of the
potential for factual overlap between the temporary reinstatement order
decision and the discrimination decision, the court concluded the doctrine’s
second prong was satisfied because the two determinations are conceptually
distinct. 77 Temporary reinstatement orders determine whether the miner’s
claim is frivolous, while the merits determination considers “whether there
is sufficient evidence of discrimination to justify permanent
reinstatement.” 78 Finally, the court found that the doctrine’s final prong was
satisfied because a court reviewing an appeal from the final merits
determination would not need to consider harms from the temporary
reinstatement order. 79 Essentially, the aggrieved party would be without
70. Id. at 742.
71. Id. at 741.
72. Id. at 742. Both the miners were subject to harassment about the drug screening
policy after one of them notified management that he was unable to provide a urine sample
with others watching. Id. This harassment and ridicule kept both miners from producing a
urine sample on the day of their scheduled drug screening. Id. The following day, both
miners had a drug screening at a medical facility. Id. Neither miner tested positive for any
illegal substance. Id. Jim Walter Resources refused to accept the test results. Id. at 741-42.
73. Id. at 742-43.
74. Id. at 743.
75. Id. at 744-45.
76. Id. at 744 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 745.
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“any opportunity for a judicial hearing of its claims [as to the temporary
reinstatement order].” 80 After establishing jurisdiction through the doctrine,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the miners’ claims were not frivolous
and affirmed the temporary reinstatement order.81 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision established precedent to support the collateral order
doctrine’s application to temporary reinstatement orders.
2. Vulcan Construction Materials v. Federal Mine Safety & Health
Review Commission
In Vulcan Construction Materials v. Federal Mine Safety & Health
Review Commission, the Seventh Circuit also held that a temporary
reinstatement order was appealable through the collateral order doctrine,
albeit in a much briefer analysis.82 A miner filed a discrimination complaint
with the Secretary alleging that Vulcan Construction Material, the mine
operator, terminated him for engaging in a protected safety-related
activity. 83 After determining that the miner did not frivolously bring the
claim, the Secretary applied to the Commission for a temporary
reinstatement order. 84 Upon further investigation, the Secretary concluded
that no discrimination occurred.85 Based on the Secretary’s findings,
Vulcan moved to dissolve the order, but the ALJ denied the request. 86
Vulcan then filed for Commission review of the ALJ’s denial of the
motion. 87 A divided Commission upheld the ALJ’s decision to deny the
motion. 88 Vulcan then appealed the Commission’s decision to the Seventh
Circuit. 89
Echoing the analysis from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jim Walter
Resources, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine’s
three prongs were satisfied. 90 First, the court noted that the Commission’s
decision regarding the motion to dissolve the order was conclusive. 91
Second, the court held that because the motion’s dissolution depended on
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 751.
700 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id.
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an interpretation of the Mine Act, it was separate from the underlying
discrimination complaint.92 Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an
appeal of the merits decision would not require a court to review the
temporary reinstatement order, which would deprive the mine operator of
the opportunity to dispute the order.93 While the Seventh Circuit’s
discussion of the collateral order doctrine is concise, it ultimately
strengthened the validity of the Jim Walter Resources holding.
III. Cobra Natural Resources, LLC v. Federal Mine Safety & Health
Review Commission: A Turning Point
The Fourth Circuit deviated from its sister circuits in Cobra by refusing
to review a temporary reinstatement order through the collateral order
doctrine. 94
A. Facts
Russell Ratliff, an underground equipment operator, began working at a
Cobra-operated mine in Wharncliff, West Virginia, in June of 2008.95
Following the Upper Big Branch mine disaster in April of 2010, which
claimed the lives of twenty-nine miners in Montcoal, West Virginia,96
Cobra instituted a policy requiring a mandatory safety meeting at the
beginning of each shift.97 During the October 9, 2012, daily safety meeting,
Ratliff spoke out about the prominent ventilation problems in the mine. 98
Specifically, Ratliff stated that the cut cycle was unsafe because it required
the miners to breathe dust particles, which causes significant health risks.99
Over the next week, Ratliff submitted several anonymous “Running Right”
cards, a system by which miners could notify the mine operator of any
safety concerns. 100 Cobra terminated Ratliff on October 17, 2012, citing
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 920
F.2d 738, 745 (11th Cir. 1990)).
94. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82,
92 (4th Cir. 2014).
95. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Nat. Res.,
LLC, 35 FMSHRC 101, 105 (2013).
96. Clement Daly, Four Years Since the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/04/05/ubbaa05.html.
97. Ratliff, 35 FMSHRC at 106.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

96

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:85

poor attitude and work performance. 101 Ratliff contended that Cobra
terminated him because of his numerous safety complaints. 102 He
subsequently filed a discrimination complaint with the Secretary. 103
After finding that Ratliff did not frivolously bring the discrimination
claim, the Secretary applied to the Commission for a temporary
reinstatement order. 104 Cobra requested a hearing, which was set for
January 7, 2013. At the hearing Cobra alleged that Ratliff’s claim was
frivolous given his history of insubordination. 105 Additionally, Cobra
contended that because it would have laid off Ratliff on January 15, 2013,
three months after he was terminated, the reinstatement order should be
tolled to that date.106 But the ALJ rejected the tolling affirmative defense,
found that the claim was not frivolously brought, and directed Cobra to
reinstate Ratliff. 107 Cobra then requested review of the temporary
reinstatement order by the Commission. 108 The Commission subsequently
upheld the ALJ’s decision in the temporary reinstatement hearing. 109 Cobra
subsequently sought review by the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the
collateral order doctrine gave the court jurisdiction.110
B. Procedural History, Issue, and Holding
Rather than deciding whether the Commission erred in rejecting Cobra’s
tolling argument, the Fourth Circuit focused on the threshold question of
whether the collateral order doctrine allowed it to exercise jurisdiction over
the case. 111 Although both parties conceded that the court had jurisdiction,
the Fourth Circuit, in a 2–1 decision, held that an interlocutory review of
the Commission’s order was not proper because the order did not satisfy the
three requirements of the collateral order doctrine.112

101. Id. at 104.
102. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82,
84 (4th Cir. 2014).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ratliff, 35 FMSHRC at 104-05.
106. Id. at 117.
107. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 85.
108. Id.
109. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Nat. Res., 35
FMSHRC 394 (2013).
110. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 83.
111. Id. at 92.
112. Id. at 85.
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C. The Majority’s Decision
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis with an emphasis on the three
most recent Supreme Court opinions discussing the doctrine: Will v.
Hallock, Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc., and
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter. The court used these cases to attack
the persuasiveness of both the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ decisions on
the issue. 113 The court contended that because Jim Walter Resources was
decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Will, Digital Equipment,
and Mohawk Industries, it was not consistent with the “narrow and limited
scope of the collateral order doctrine” intended by the Supreme Court.114 In
a similar fashion, the Fourth Circuit quickly dismissed the Seventh Circuit’s
jurisdictional analysis in Vulcan as too brief to be convincing. 115
Unencumbered by the weight of the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit
opinions, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to analyze each of the collateral
order doctrine’s three prongs and ultimately concluded that none were
satisfied. 116 For the Fourth Circuit, the doctrine’s first prong—whether an
order “conclusively determine[s] a disputed question”—was not met
because an ALJ can review and modify a temporary reinstatement order if
the mine operator raises a successful tolling defense. 117 The court reasoned
that an ALJ’s ability to revisit and modify the order prevented it from truly
being conclusive. 118 The court also used the presence of a tolling defense to
distinguish the facts in Cobra from those in Jim Walter Resources. In the
former, the mine operator asserted a tolling defense; in the latter, the
operator did not. 119 Therefore, the presence of a tolling defense in Cobra
rendered the order “expressly held open for the possibility of
reconsideration,” which would fail the doctrine’s first requirement. 120
In a similar manner, the court found that the doctrine’s second prong—
whether an order “resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from
the merits of the action,”—was also not satisfied. 121 While acknowledging

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 88-92.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)).
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that the miner’s burden of proof is significantly lower at the temporaryreinstatement-order stage, the court nonetheless held that review of the
collateral order would overlap too significantly with the final merits
determination to satisfy the doctrine’s second requirement. 122 As the Fourth
Circuit phrased it, “[A] temporary reinstatement analysis is simply a highly
deferential look at the same basic facts and factors that ultimately control
the outcome of the miner’s claim.” 123 Put simply, because “the
considerations involved in the temporary reinstatement process are deeply
enmeshed with the factual and legal issues comprising the miner’s
underlying discrimination claim,” the order failed the severability
requirement of the second prong. 124
Finally, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the doctrine’s third prong—
whether the order would be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment”—mirrored that of the previous two prongs. 125 An
unreviewable order “has significant and irreparable effects” or impacts
“rights that would be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate
appeal.” 126 Relying on a handful of Supreme Court cases that invoked the
doctrine, the Fourth Circuit determined that Cobra’s economic injury did
not fall within the scope of interest typically protected under the doctrine. 127
The interests common to collateral order doctrine analysis include
presidential, sovereign, or qualified immunity claims or cases involving the
rights of criminal defendants.128 Ultimately, the court held that because “a
coal operator’s economic interest do[es] not begin to approach the
importance of several interests . . . that the Supreme Court has deemed”
reviewable under the doctrine,” the temporary reinstatement order failed
this third and final prong. 129 At bottom, because the majority held that the
prongs of the collateral order doctrine were not met, the Fourth Circuit held
it lacked power to review the case. One judge disagreed.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Will, 546 U.S. at 349).
Id. (quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985)).
Id. at 91.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
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D. The Dissent
Judge Agee argued that temporary reinstatement orders are reviewable
under § 816 of the Mine Act rather than through the collateral order
doctrine. 130 From his perspective, denying review of the order would create
unreviewable harm for the mine operator for three reasons.131 First, Cobra’s
arguments against the temporary reinstatement order would be moot by the
time the Commission decided the merits of Ratliff’s discrimination
claim. 132 Second, refusing review of these orders would preclude a mine
operator from recovering the wages paid during the reinstatement period
because no administrative procedure exists for this recovery. 133 Finally,
allowing a disgruntled employee back into the work force could cause a
major disruption in the working environment. 134 In sum, not allowing
review of this order would deprive the mine operator of the ability “to
correct a mistaken agency decision below.” 135 But the mine operator is not
the only one harmed.
In a similar vein, Judge Agee pointed to harm suffered by a miner if
review is denied. 136 When a miner is denied a temporary reinstatement
order, the unavailability of judicial review may “defeat the Mine Act’s
enforcement mechanisms and, in turn, the Congressional intent in adopting
this legislation.” 137
Moving beyond his first argument, Judge Agee then considered whether
the collateral order doctrine allowed for appellate review of temporary
reinstatement orders. 138 Agee took issue with the majority’s focus on the
Commission’s discretion to toll the reinstatement order.139 He emphasized
that “an order can be conclusive even if there is some possibility that the
tribunal below will reconsider.” 140 Judge Agee also noted that, in this case
specifically, “The ALJ spoke in unequivocal terms and ordered Cobra to
provide ‘immediate reinstatement’ to Ratliff.” 141 He then pointed out that in

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 93 (Agee, J., dissenting).
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 98.
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spite of the majority’s argument to the contrary, the “Supreme Court
accepts some ‘factual overlap’ in the collateral order context.”142
Additionally, he argued, because a temporary reinstatement order has no
impact on the final resolution of the discrimination claim, the order would
satisfy the severability requirement.143
Finally, rather than focusing on the specific economic impact faced by
Cobra (as the majority had), the dissent framed the importance of the
interest at stake in much broader terms. 144 Judge Agee stated that when a
mine operator, like Cobra, appeals the Commission’s decision to reinstate a
worker, “it faces the prospect of paying unjustified money to a miner,
reinstating a problematic worker, or facing legally unsustainable procedures
below.” 145 Conversely, when a miner appeals the Commission’s denial of a
reinstatement order, “he wishes to vindicate his right to much-needed
contemporary payment and a fair process below.” 146 These interests, he
concluded, fall within the scope of the interests typically protected in the
doctrine’s third prong analysis. 147 Ultimately, Judge Agee came the correct
conclusion: temporary reinstatement orders should be reviewable.
IV. Analysis
The Fourth Circuit’s drastic departure from the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits’ opinions is unwarranted. The majority places too much emphasis
on the ability of a mine operator to assert a tolling defense, narrowly
construes the severability requirement of the doctrine, and fails to consider
the consequences of denying review of temporary reinstatement orders as a
whole.
A. Tolling the Impact of the Tolling Affirmative Defense
The majority’s attack on the conclusive characteristic of temporary
reinstatement orders is two-fold. 148 First, an ALJ’s ability to modify a
temporary reinstatement order in light of a mine operator’s tolling defense
prevents the orders from being conclusive.149 Second, because Jim Walter
Resources was decided prior to the Commission’s 2009 ruling in Secretary
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 88.
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of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Administration ex. rel Gatlin v.
KenAmerican Resources, Inc., 150 which discussed an ALJ’s ability to
modify a temporary reinstatement order in response to a tolling defense,
Jim Walter Resources is no longer relevant law. 151
The two cases cited by the Fourth Circuit in support of its first
argument—Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 152 and Jamison v.
Wiley, 153—are factually distinguishable from Cobra Natural Resources,
LLC. 154 In both cases, an appellate court refused to review a district court
decision through the collateral order doctrine because the judge intended to
review and modify his initial decision. 155 The key factual distinction is that
in both cases, the district court judge unequivocally expressed an intention
to return to the particular disputed issue. 156 But here, as Judge Agee noted
in his dissent, the ALJ in Cobra never indicated any intent to return to the
temporary reinstatement order.157 Plainly, these cases shed no light on the
availability of collateral order doctrine review when the presiding judge, be
it an ALJ or a federal district judge, has the discretion to review a decision
but has not expressed an intention to do so. At best, the Fourth Circuit’s
cited authority supports the idea that if an ALJ expresses an intention to
review and modify a temporary reinstatement order, then the order cannot
be conclusive. Regardless of the proposition’s soundness, it is inapplicable
to the facts of Cobra.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit’s argument that the Commission’s
Gatlin decision represents a turning point in the availability of the tolling
defense is unfounded. Despite the crystal-clear precedent contained within
the Commission’s opinion, the Fourth Circuit mischaracterizes Gatlin as the
first Commission opinion to discuss the tolling defense. This is startling
because Gatlin cites previous Commission decisions where the tolling

150. 31 FMSHRC 1050 (2009).
151. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 89.
152. 514 U.S. 35 (1995).
153. 14 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1994).
154. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 97-98 (Agee, J., dissenting).
155. Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 39 (1995) (noting that the district
court denied a defendant’s motion for reconsideration on a motion for summary judgment
but expressed an intention to revisit the decision prior to the jury deliberations); Jamison v.
Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 230 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that when the district court ruled on a
substitution motion, it noted that the decision was only temporary).
156. Swint, 514 U.S. at 39; Jamison, 14 F.3d at 230.
157. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 98 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“The ALJ spoke in
unequivocal terms and ordered Cobra to provide ‘immediate reinstatement’ to Ratliff.”).
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defense was both recognized and applied. 158 The idea that Jim Walters
Resources is obsolete due to the “emergence” of the tolling defense is
contradicted by Gatlin itself. The Gatlin decision cites the Commission’s
decision, affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in Jim Walter Resources, as
authority on the subject of temporary reinstatement orders. 159 In sum,
Gatlin did not change the legal landscape for temporary reinstatement
orders; rather, it affirmed a long-standing concept. The alternative
interpretation of the decision advanced by the Fourth Circuit does not pass
muster.
B. Six Degrees of Separation?
The Cobra majority employs an unnecessarily restricted interpretation of
the doctrine’s second requirement that is inconsistent with existing
Supreme Court precedent. In the majority’s view, temporary reinstatement
orders do not meet the collateral order doctrine’s second requirement
because “a temporary reinstatement analysis is simply a highly deferential
look at the same basic facts and factors that ultimately control the outcome
of the miner’s claim.” 160 Citing its own precedent on the doctrine’s second
prong, the Fourth Circuit underplays the two very different burdens of proof
between a temporary reinstatement order and a miner’s claim by arguing
that the “factual and legal issues” of each procedure are “deeply
enmeshed.” 161 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis is problematic because it
essentially ignores the Supreme Court’s prior discussion of the
“severability” principle of the doctrine, particularly in Mitchell v.
Forsyth. 162 As the Mitchell dissent aptly noted, the Supreme Court has
shown a willingness to allow factual overlap with the doctrine, especially
when qualified or absolute immunity is involved. 163 In spite of this Supreme
Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit relied on its own precedent which holds
that the second prong is not satisfied when there is a “threat of substantial

158. Sec’y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health ex rel Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., 31
FMSHRC 1050, 1054 (2009) (listing Commission decisions from 1940, 1984, 1985, and
1989 all advocating for the tolling of a terminated employee’s back pay or reinstatement
when a reduction in workforce was shown).
159. See id. (citing Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
920 F.2d 738 (11th Cir. 1990)) (describing the burden of proof and scope of temporary
reinstatement orders).
160. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 90.
161. Id.
162. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
163. Id. at 527-28; Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 98.
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duplication of judicial decision making . . . .” 164 Because this language
requires a strict separation of the issues when one is not required by
Mitchell, this narrow construction of the second prong is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s clear decision to allow overlap between the collateral
order decision and the final merits determination.
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis could be more persuasive with a different
line of argument. Rather than downplaying the conceptual distinction
between temporary reinstatement orders and the final merits determination,
the Fourth Circuit should have decided that the Supreme Court’s recent
trilogy of cases addressing the doctrine—Will, Mohawk Industries, and
Digital Equipment—essentially abrogated the Court’s prior, more lenient
interpretation of the second prong. The Supreme Court has not explicitly
overturned Mitchell. 165 However, the Court’s recent emphasis on a limited
application of the doctrine could support the Fourth Circuit’s more narrow
interpretation of the doctrine. By focusing on the burden of proof in the two
distinct procedures rather than the evolution of the doctrine, 166 the Fourth
Circuit nearly sidesteps the issue. Without arguing that the doctrine has
evolved in some manner, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation cannot be
reconciled with the Supreme Court’s allowance of decisional overlap in
Mitchell.
C. The Interest at Stake: Looking at the Big Picture
The majority’s argument regarding the doctrine’s third prong addresses
both components of the requirement: the unavailability of review and the
importance of the interest at stake. 167 The majority essentially concedes
that, as the coal operator appealing the temporary reinstatement orders,
Cobra’s interest would not be re-dressable absent an appeal.168 The Fourth
Circuit focused instead on the economic characteristics of the interests at
stake. 169 Ultimately, the court refused to review the temporary
reinstatement

164. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 89 (quoting Dickens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 677
F.2d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2010)).
165. See, e.g., id. at 91 (referencing the Court’s analysis in Mitchell).
166. Id. at 90.
167. Id. at 90-92.
168. Id. at 92.
169. Id.
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order because “a coal operator’s financial interest in avoiding wage
payments to a reinstated miner who returns to his job in the coal mines
pales in comparison to those interests that have been deemed sufficiently
important to give rise to collateral order jurisdiction.” 170 This analysis is
lacking. Because the Supreme Court requires a court to consider an entire
class of orders when considering whether to allow a collateral order
doctrine appeal, 171 the Fourth Circuit erred by only considering the mine
operator’s interests when deciding whether temporary reinstatement orders
should be reviewable.
1. Unavailability of Review
Conceding that the mine operator’s interests would be unreviewable on
appeal does not relieve the court of its obligation to consider the impact of
its decision on the miner’s interests.172 By only analyzing the situation from
the perspective of a mine operator’s appeal, the court fails to consider the
equally probable scenario of a miner’s appeal of the Commission’s decision
regarding a temporary reinstatement order. One way to illustrate the Fourth
Circuit’s incomplete analysis is to consider what impact the court’s decision
would have in all possible circumstances. Under the Mine Act, courts may
only review final Commission orders. 173 If temporary reinstatement orders
are not considered final orders either under the Mine Act or through the
application of the collateral order doctrine, four possible scenarios emerge.
! Scenario One: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the
Secretary. The Secretary finds that the miner’s claims were not
frivolously brought and applies to the Commission for a temporary
reinstatement order. The Commission grants the order. After an
investigation, the Secretary finds that the mine operator violated the
terms of the Mine Act and files a complaint with the Commission.
After a hearing, the Commission finds the mine operator guilty of
discrimination. The mine operator appeals the Commission’s final
decision.

170. Id.
171. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994).
172. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 99 (Agee, J., dissenting).
173. Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2004); Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety
& Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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! Scenario Two: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the
Secretary. The Secretary initially finds that the miner’s claims were
frivolously brought and does not apply to the Commission for a
temporary reinstatement order. After an investigation, however, the
Secretary finds that the mine operator violated the terms of the
Mine Act and files a complaint with the Commission. After a
hearing, the Commission finds the mine operator guilty of
discrimination. The mine operator appeals the Commission’s final
decision.
! Scenario Three: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the
Secretary. The Secretary finds that the miner’s claims were not
frivolously brought and applies to the Commission for a temporary
reinstatement order. The Commission grants the order. After an
investigation, however, the Secretary finds that the mine operator
did not violate the terms of the Mine Act. The miner then files a
complaint with the Commission on his own behalf. After a hearing,
the Commission finds the mine operator not guilty of
discrimination. The miner appeals the Commission’s final decision.
! Scenario Four: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the
Secretary. The Secretary finds that the miner’s claims were
frivolously brought and does not apply to the Commission for a
temporary reinstatement order. After an investigation, the Secretary
finds that the mine operator did not violate the terms of the Mine
Act. The miner then files a complaint with the Commission on his
own behalf. After a hearing, the Commission finds the mine
operator not guilty of discrimination. The miner appeals the
Commission’s final decision. 174

174. Procedurally, scenarios Three and Four have two different avenues to the same
outcome. Rather than the miner filing a complaint with the Commission his own behalf, the
Secretary may find that there is enough evidence to warrant filing a complaint with the
Commission. After the hearing, the Commission may vacate the Secretary’s finding of
discrimination. Under either avenue, the result is the same: the mine operator is not guilty of
discrimination and the miner appeals the Commission’s decision.
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Scenario 1
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Scenario 4
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and does not apply
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and files a
complaint with the
Commission

violated the terms
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and files a
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the terms of the
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did not violate
the terms of the
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the Commission
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behalf.
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the Commission
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discrimination. The
mine operator
appeals the
Commission’s final
decision.
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discrimination. The
mine operator
appeals the
Commission’s final
decision.

not guilty of
discrimination.
The miner
appeals the
Commission’s
final decision

not guilty of
discrimination.
The miner
appeals the
Commission’s
final decision

A. Scenarios Two and Three
While temporary reinstatement orders do not merge with or impact the
final discrimination decision, the ultimate discrimination decision does
impact whether the party aggrieved by the temporary reinstatement order
has the opportunity to present those arguments on appeal. 175 In Scenarios
Two and Three, the party injured by the temporary reinstatement order—
the miner in Scenario Two and the mine operator in Scenario Three—
ultimately receives a favorable Commission order. In either situation, the
appealing party would have little, if any, incentive to appeal the
Commission’s order only to address the grievances regarding the temporary
175. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 96 (Agee, J., dissenting) (highlighting that if
temporary reinstatement orders are not considered final, “a miner’s appeal from an adverse
decision on temporary reinstatement will now be foreclosed because the mine operator and
the miner share equal appeal rights”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss1/4

2016]

NOTES

107

reinstatement order. More likely, the losing party—the mine operator in
Scenario Two and the miner in Scenario Three—would appeal the
Commission’s final order. In that situation, it is unlikely that the party
aggrieved by the temporary reinstatement order but ultimately victorious on
the discrimination claim would be able to present arguments against the
Commission’s temporary reinstatement decision on appeal. Ultimately,
even if the parties overcame these procedural curiosities, they face the same
hurdles as the parties appealing in Scenarios One and Four.
B. Scenarios One and Four
Scenarios One and Four are more favorable for the party aggrieved by
the temporary reinstatement order because unlike Scenarios Two and Three,
the party is at least afforded an opportunity to present arguments against the
Commission’s decision on appeal. In Scenario Two, during the appeal of
the Commission’s order finding discrimination, the mine operator may raise
arguments regarding the initial temporary reinstatement order. Conversely,
in Scenario Three, during the appeal of the Commission’s order denying
discrimination, the miner may raise arguments regarding the denial of the
initial temporary reinstatement order. Having a forum to present the
arguments, however, does not guarantee that the reviewing court will
entertain the arguments or have the ability to grant relief.
In both scenarios, the appealing party faces the prospect that the
reviewing court’s jurisdiction is limited in some respect. For example, the
court’s jurisdiction may be limited to review of the final merits decision
because temporary reinstatement orders are not final decisions reviewable
under § 816 of the Mine Act. Alternatively, the reviewing court’s
jurisdiction may not be limited because the two procedures are sufficiently
related to permit review of both. Ultimately, the court’s interpretation of the
procedures may impact whether the appealing party can raise their
arguments regarding the temporary reinstatement order during the appeal of
the Commission’s final decision.
Assuming the circuit court allows the temporary reinstatement order
arguments on appeal, neither the mine operator nor the miner’s injury is
fully re-dressable. 176 For the mine operator in Scenario One, even if a court
finds that the miner was erroneously reinstated, no procedural mechanism
exists that would allow the mine operator to recover the wages paid to the

176. Id. at 95.
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miner while the miner was temporarily reinstated.177 Conversely, for the
miner in Scenario Four, even if the reviewing court finds that Commission
improperly denied the temporary reinstatement order, any recovered wages
do not redress the full extent of the miner’s injury. 178 The purpose of the
orders is two-fold: to provide temporary economic relief to miners bringing
discrimination claims and to encourage miners to engage in protected
activities without subjecting themselves to financial vulnerability. 179 If a
miner is only able to recover lost wages, the true force of the orders is never
realized.
1. More than Dollars and Cents
Even if the injury suffered by the mine operator as a result of a
temporary reinstatement order is purely financial, for the miners, the
interest protected by the temporary reinstatement order is more than dollars
and cents. As the Mine Act’s legislative history indicates, the purpose of
temporary reinstatements orders is to incentivize enforcement of the Mine
Act by providing economic protection to miners terminated for engaging in
protected activities.180 Much like qualified immunity exists to protect
officials acting in a discretionary capacity from litigation,181 temporary
reinstatement orders exist to protect miners who are inherently vulnerable
to discriminatory termination. 182 And in the same way qualified immunity
incentivizes officials to use their discretion without the fear of suit,
temporary reinstatement orders incentivize miners to hold their employers
responsible for substandard working conditions without the fear of losing
their jobs. Fearing that a temporary reinstatement order may not be granted
and knowing that the decision is unreviewable, future miners may be
deterred from complying with the Mine Act.183 Ultimately, the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion deprives the Mine Act of its best enforcement mechanism.

177. Id. (“As counsel for the Secretary conceded, no procedure exists that allows an
operator to recoup wages paid to a temporarily reinstated miner for all periods before a final
merits decision.”).
178. Id. at 96.
179. See id.
180. Id. (referencing S. REP. NO. 95–181, at 37 (1977)).
181. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009).
182. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 96, 99 (Agee, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
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V. Conclusion
In sum, the Fourth Circuit’s decision should be rejected as an improper
departure from its sister circuits. By holding that temporary reinstatement
orders fail each prong of the collateral order doctrine, the Fourth Circuit
misconstrues the reach of the tolling affirmative defense, narrowly
construes the Supreme Court’s discussion of the doctrine’s severability
requirement, and fails to consider the impact on all interests impacted by
the decision. Even further, the Fourth Circuit thwarts Congress’s specific
intent of enforcing safe mining practices by undermining the Mine Act’s
primary enforcement mechanism. Based on this opinion, miners must now
be cautious in their compliance with the Mine Act or else they risk losing
their livelihood without a second thought by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Lindsay N. Kistler
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